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Abstract 
The frequency and economic value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has 
grown significantly during the last decades. In the same time, research and development 
(R&D) capability has been increasingly important for firms’ success. Current research on 
M&As is vast, and shows a surprisingly high failure rate, which is often explained by post-
merger integration (PMI) problems. However, the research on R&D post M&A is 
understudied in comparison to other aspects of M&As. The goal with this study was 
therefore to widen the M&A research and deepen the understanding of PMI problems in the 
case of R&D, as well as eliciting how synergies from the M&A can be utilized for R&D. The 
research was based on a qualitative and explanatory case study. The empirical data for the 
research was gathered by performing three semi-structured interviews with persons in 
managerial positions in large technology-oriented firms that had been subject to M&As. In 
addition to the interviews, a literature review on existing theories was performed. The data 
from the interviews and the literature review was analysed by categorisation according to 
the guidelines of grounded theory. The results showed that the largest PMI problem for R&D 
was to harmonize different managerial strategies and working procedures of the merging 
parts. Several synergies for R&D were identified, the most notable one was that by 
combining different areas of knowledge, products in new business areas could be developed 
more efficiently by the new entity than if the merging parts were to do so on their own. It 
was learned that for an M&A to bring such R&D synergies, it is important to have an 
adequate mix of complementary- and substitutive technological relatedness between the 
merging parts. It is also important to have a clear integration plan that shows where 
different knowledge in the new entity exists and that focuses on R&D employee retention. 
Finally, it was also shown that following cross-border M&As, the R&D organization will be 
geographically dispersed which necessitates efficient managerial procedures to facilitate 
cooperation between R&D employees in different locations. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter serves as an introduction of the topic for the reader. It will give a background to 
the problem, present the research questions as well as motivate why the subject is 
interesting and important to study. 
1.1 Background 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), is a commonly used term in the field of International 
Business. A merger, two firms coming together to form a single entity, has a different 
meaning than an acquisition, an asset bought or obtained, but is used as one abbreviation. 
The companies who form a merger are seldom completely equal to each other, and it is 
therefore argued that a merger also can be held as an acquisition (Humpal, 1971). 
With the world becoming more globalized, more cross-border M&A follows. Cross-border 
M&A are a common way to expand, not only because of globalization but also due to 
technological development (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). However, M&A are complex and to 
make the deal into a success is not a simple task. R&D and economic growth both play a vital 
role for a firm’s development (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). While R&D has an important role 
for cross-border M&A, the role international companies play for R&D is also increasing. 
During the last couple of decades, government spending in R&D as shares of total spending 
has decreased in the OECD countries (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The international firms 
have taken a larger share in the total amount of R&D spending and non-state share of total 
funding is steadily increasing. Historically, these MNC have kept most of their R&D in their 
home country, but nowadays, R&D funding from a non-national source has risen and the 
MNC share of the foreign sourced R&D is about 85 % (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).   
However, even though international firms’ importance for R&D has increased, there is a 
limited amount of research on what impact the increased cross-border M&A have on R&D 
(Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006). 
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1.2 Problematization 
Cross-border M&As, i.e. M&As involving at least one international firm (defined as a firm 
with business activities in two or more markets), have increased significantly during the past 
decades. Data from the European Central Bank shows a nine-fold increase in total cross-
border M&A value between 1985 and 2006, although facing a setback of about 50 % 
between 2007 and 2011 due to the financial crisis (UNCTAD, 2012). In the same study by the 
European Central Bank two main motives for M&A were identified; efficiency- and strategic 
motives. Efficiency motives are gains from positive synergies from e.g. economies of scale or 
scope. Strategic motives are gains from strengthened market positions following the M&As 
(Coeurdacier et al., 2009). Paradoxically, the increasing M&A activity is followed by a lot of 
research that shows a high failure rate (Weber and Tarba, 2012). It has for instance been 
shown in a study of 160 mergers published in the McKinsey quarterly report, 2004 issue 2, 
that 70 % of the mergers failed to achieve expected synergies (Christofferson et al., 2004). 
One of the keys to a successful M&A lies in keeping focus on R&D (Hitt et al., 2001; Samad, 
2009). In today’s increasingly competitive business environment, product development 
capability is a requirement for a firm’s success in most markets (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992). Because of the increasing M&A activity, it is of interest to evaluate how M&As affect 
the R&D function of firms. Some studies have been performed on R&D performance post 
M&A but the results have been rather inconclusive and contradictive. Some has found a 
positive correlation between R&D expenditures and M&As (Miyazaki, 2009; Bertrand, 2009). 
Although a propensity for R&D intensive companies to have a lower than average tendency 
to acquire other firms were found by Blonigen and Taylor (2000) when doing a study of 217 
high-tech companies in the United States indicating that companies either focus on 
development on their own or through M&As. A study by Cassiman et al. (2005) rejected 
economies of scale in R&D post M&A, but found possibilities for economies of scope. 
Valentini (2012) found that patent quantity tends to increase but that the impact of those 
patents decreased after an M&A. A study of firms in OECD countries finds little correlation 
between R&D spending and M&A at all (Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006). All in all, it seems far 
from certain to reap any benefits on R&D performance from M&As. 
Some research has been made on possible explanations for difficulties in leveraging R&D 
performance after an M&A and many mean that post-merger integration (PMI) problems 
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are the primary issues (Kummer, 2009; Hill, 2010; Gates and Very, 2003). When reviewing 
existing literature on the subject, it can be noticed that although several studies have been 
made on quantitative data, qualitative studies are scarce. The ones that exist usually 
describe their results in general and broad terms, for example blaming PMI problems as 
mentioned above. Such broad explanations are not very helpful for R&D managers facing the 
challenge of an M&A. The intent of this study is to provide an increased depth of knowledge 
in the subject in order to answer questions like how, what and why to provide usable results 
for future managers. To do so, qualitative data from large cross-border M&As in the 
technology and industrial sectors will be collected in order to answer the following 
questions: 
1. How can positive synergies for R&D be utilized following an M&A?  
2. What are the main problems for R&D post M&A? 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this case study is to analyze R&D departments of different firms following an 
M&A in order to elicit qualitative information on what the difficulties following an M&A are 
and how can they be avoided. The study will also focus on finding positive synergies that can 
be used in R&D post M&A. Such synergies will be analyzed according to their degree of 
utilization and possible ways to increase gains from using them. The report will serve as food 
for thought for R&D managers on important aspects to consider for taking advantage of an 
M&A. 
1.4 Delimitations 
This report will not examine whether or not the M&As in the case study have been 
successful or not, since there are numerous ways to perform such evaluation. Product 
Development (PD) and Research and Development (R&D) will be treated as equalities and 
the phrases will be used interchangeably. Only large firms in technology oriented sectors will 
be evaluated in the case study since they are considered to have R&D organizations large 
enough for the results to have some transferability. This report will be purely qualitative; 
some numerical data from the companies in the case studies will be presented although no 
quantitative analysis will be performed. 
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2 Method 
This chapter describes and motivates the methodology of the methods used in order for the 
reader to understand the approach taken to the study. The chapter also contains a discussion 
of the credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability and authenticity of the results. 
2.1 Research Approach 
There are two main categories of methods when conducting social sciences; quantitative 
and qualitative studies. Quantitative studies are based on an extensive collection of data 
that can be statistically analyzed. Qualitative studies search for reasons for certain behaviors 
in order to get an in-depth understanding. This is done by putting oneself into the 
perspective of the investigated object/objects to be able to understand the problem from an 
insider perspective (Holme et al., 1997). The research questions in this report are of an 
explaining kind that aims to improve and obtain in-depth knowledge in the field of R&D post 
M&A. For such deepening and complex research question the input from persons active in 
the field is important and it is therefore particularly suited for a qualitative approach in 
which in-depth knowledge can truly be elicited. 
2.2 The Case Study 
According to Yin (2009) case studies are well-suited for answering research questions that 
are of a “how” and “why” nature, although also applicable for answering “what” according 
to Ghauri (2004). There are numerous kinds of case studies, according to Merriam and 
Nilsson (1994), the two main categories are the inductive and the deductive. Deductive case 
studies are generally used to test the validity of a hypothesis or research question derived 
from theoretical studies. Inductive case studies are instead based on a presumption-free 
collection of data that is later used in order to build new theories or conclusions, as stated in 
a lecture by Dr. Lars Norén on 27 March 2013. Additionally, a case study can either be 
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. These three methods overlap even if they differ in 
many ways. As Yin (2009:8) puts it: “The goal is to avoid gross misfits-that is, when you are 
planning to use one type of method but another is really more advantageous”. An 
exploratory case study is useful when the researchers control different input variables to the 
system of interest, and thus analyze output responses. A descriptive case study is used for 
obtaining information and describe in detail rather than finding input-output connections 
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(Merriam and Nilsson, 1994). The explanatory case study is used to investigate and explain, 
rather than explore characteristics of a phenomenon (Yin, 2009). 
The purpose of this study is to answer questions that are of the kind “what”, “how” and 
“why”, which according to Yin (2009) and Ghauri (2004) makes a case study a preferable tool 
to use. An explanatory case study approach will be used since the research questions are 
well-suited to be of an explaining character. In addition, since the study is based on past 
events it would not be possible to control any inputs in the studies, thus making an 
experimental approach impossible. The purpose of the report is not to test any hypothesis, 
but rather to try to describe and explain effects on R&D post M&A. Therefore, an inductive 
instead of a deductive approach to the case study was taken. This implied that the project 
started without a clear formulation of the problem, it was developed during the course of 
the project when sufficient knowledge of the subject had been developed.  The method 
used for the case study followed the procedure presented by Dr. Lars Norén on his lecture 
27 March 2013. A broad initial research question was decided: What happens to R&D post 
M&A, why and for what reason? Thereafter empirical- and theoretical data was collected 
through concurrently performing an extensive literature review combined with three case 
studies. 
2.3 Data collection 
Data is usually divided in two different categories: Primary and secondary data. Primary data 
is collected for the first time by the researcher with the sole purpose of being used in the 
research project. Typical examples of primary data collection methods are observations, 
interviews or surveys (Booth et al., 2004). Contrary to primary data, secondary data has 
previously been processed by other researchers for different purposes than the current 
research project. Secondary data collection methods are for example literature reviews of 
books, articles and other publications (Holme et al., 1997). The data in this report is collected 
by both primary and secondary research in order to be able to compare empirical findings of 
primary research with existing knowledge in the form of a theoretical framework built on 
secondary research. 
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Secondary data for this report has been collected through an extensive literature review in 
order to create a strong theoretical framework, presented in chapter three. The majority of 
the data was collected from books or articles published in scientific journals, some data was 
also collected from annual reports provided by the companies that was studied. The data in 
the literature review was found in databases through the search engine Summon provided 
by the library at the University of Gothenburg (www.ub.gu.se) and the library at Chalmers 
University of Technology (www.lib.chalmers.se). 
In this report, three interviews will be used as the main source of primary data because of 
their suitability for gathering in-depth knowledge. Surveys were perceived as unfeasible 
since the answers needed in the study were of a far too complex nature to be able to catch 
with surveys. Observations could have been a usable approach to see how the R&D 
organization and the involved people acted before and after the M&A. Because of the time 
constraints of the study and the usually long process of an M&A, past events needed to be 
studied and thus no observations could be performed. 
2.3.1 Interview method 
There are different ways to structure an interview. A method of conducting an interview is 
the structured interview where no follow-up questions are being asked. When using this 
method, the interviewees are guided throughout the interview in a standardized and pre-
decided manner. It is usable for making cross-analyses between the different answers and 
when a large amount of interviews are held. An alternative interview method is the semi-
structured interview, which is well used for comparison between different interviews for 
qualitative research. When using semi-structured interviews, the same questions are being 
asked to all interviewees but there is space for more detailed questions and for the 
interviewee to speak freely (Mason, 1996; Bryman and Bell, 2011). This gives a good 
possibility to get a more personal perspective on the matter and also be a source of 
additional information that was not thought of ahead of the interview, as well as allowing 
new questions to be asked during the interview. The unstructured interview method is often 
used when there is little knowledge regarding the subject from the one conducting the 
interview. The unstructured method means that after the initial question, the interview has 
a character close to a normal conversation (Bryman and Bell, 2011). An advantage with the 
unstructured interview method is that the interviewee will talk what he / she thinks is most 
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important and relevant. However, a disadvantage is that analyzing a set of interviews might 
be very difficult if what is important and relevant is interpreted differently among the 
interviewees. 
In this report, semi-structured interviews have been used because of the fairly small number 
of interviews and the fact that the inductive approach taken requires openness to new 
information that can be obtained from the interviews. Since the research questions require 
an in-depth understanding in order to be answered it was also considered important to be 
able to use follow up questions to really probe the problem. The unstructured interview 
method was also taken into consideration, but as it complicates cross-evaluation, it was not 
used in this report. 
2.3.2 Selection/sampling 
There are several ways for sampling cases in a case study. The probability sampling method 
is well used in the quantitative research method. It requires that the firms to interview or 
include in questionnaires should be picked at random. In addition, a large number of 
samples should be collected in order to obtain a normal distribution curve (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). Within the qualitative research method, the two most commonly used ways of 
sampling are purposive sampling and theoretical sampling. The purposive sampling is not 
restricted by the need of randomness and large samples, but this also means that drawing a 
conclusion for the whole population will not be possible. The researcher has to choose 
samples not by random or convenience, but by what fits into the criteria that has been set 
up in order to investigate the research question (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The theoretical 
sampling is another way of thinking when conducting a research. It has been developed in 
grounded theory and described by Glaser and Strauss (1967:45) as: “The process of data 
collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his 
data and decides what data to collect next to find and where to find them, in order to 
develop his theory as it emerges. The process of data collection is controlled by the 
emerging theory whether substantive or formal”. In grounded theory, the researcher should 
continue to collect data until theoretical saturation is reached. Theoretical saturation means 
that the categories are well developed with a variety of data, and the categories have a clear 
relationship (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
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Due to time restraints of the study and a large abstinence of firms to accept being 
interviewed, the possibility sampling method was deemed insufficient. Both purposive 
sampling and the theoretical sampling were possible methods to use and they are rather 
similar, with the largest difference being that theoretical sampling is an iterative approach. 
Since data analysis was performed by categorizing empirical findings as in the grounded 
theory described by Glaser and Strauss (1967), it was decided to follow the theoretical 
sampling approach recommended by the same authors. Due to the international perspective 
of the study the interviewed companies in this report all had to fit into the criteria of being a 
technology based multinational company that had been involved in a cross-border merger or 
acquisition deal during the last 15 years. A time limit was used since it was perceived hard to 
find personnel with a clear remembrance of the M&A process if it took place too long ago. 
The first interview was chosen rather arbitrarily within the limitations described above. From 
the first interview it was concluded that in order to improve the study a diversification to 
different industries was necessary which led to the two subsequent interviews. 
2.3.3 The case studies 
The first case study was the Swedish company SKF’s acquisitions of several foreign 
companies in the lubrication systems industry between 2004 and 2010. The fact that SKF has 
been involved in several M&As in this industry makes it particularly suitable for this study. By 
comparison between the different M&As the interview can contribute to answering the 
qualitative research questions in this study. Additionally, since SKF’s operations in the 
lubrication systems industry were rather small prior to the first acquisition, it can be seen as 
a complementary technology acquisition. The second acquisition was slightly more of a 
substitutive technology acquisition, although as mentioned by SKF the technology overlap 
was rather small. To our sincere appreciation, Mr. Henrik Lange from SKF accepted our 
request for an interview. Mr. Lange currently holds the position of chief financial officer and 
executive vice president of SKF. He has previously held several managerial positions at SKF 
including President of Industrial markets for Strategic Industries, President of the Industrial 
Division and CEO of SKF’s Austrian and Polish subsidiaries. 
The second case study was the American firm Ford Motor Company (FMC)’s acquisition of 
the Swedish automobile producer Volvo Car Corporation (VCC). The reason for selecting the 
VCC-FMC case as the second interview was a wish to widen the research by also looking at 
 9 
the very competitive and scale-dependent globalized automobile market. Also, as the deals 
done by SKF were described as successful, a look at an acquisition that did not end in a 
success was perceived useful for cross-case analysis. The deal also differs from the SKF case 
as since the two firms operated in the same business and therefore had more of a 
substitutive character. We are very thankful that Mr. Peter Palmqvist accepted our interview 
request. Mr. Palmqvist has an engineering degree and currently holds the position of chief 
operating officer at Getinge. He worked for VCC from 1988 to 2009. Starting off as a 
consultant, he got promoted and became concept leader for the interior and climate 
department at VCC soon after the FMC deal. 
The third case study was performed on a company that requested anonymity for both the 
company and the interviewees. The company operated in an R&D intensive industry and has 
been subject of an acquisition in recent years. The company was chosen because it operated 
in a different industry than the previous ones. It provides increased width of the study not 
only by being active in another industry but also since the M&A occurred more recently and 
the integration phase can be seen as ongoing. The interview was performed at one event 
with five participating R&D managers and thus almost had the character of a focus group 
interview, which allowed for interesting discussions. We are very thankful for these persons’ 
participation in the interview. 
2.4 Data analysis 
Within qualitative research, analytic induction and grounded theory are the two general 
strategies used for data analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Analytic induction is a framework 
based on the research question put into a hypothesis which is then tested against the 
findings of the research. If the findings in the research do not concur with the hypothesis, a 
new hypothesis has to be formulated and tested until a hypothesis cannot be rejected by the 
cases and the research question answered.  This method has the possibility of becoming 
time-consuming if the initial hypothesis should be rejected several times. It also lacks 
guidelines of how many cases that has to be investigated before a hypothesis is proven 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
Grounded theory is not based on setting up a hypothesis and then test if it cannot be 
rejected by findings from the cases, but is rather a theory where an explanation or theory to 
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the initial research question develops along the way of the study. As Strauss and Corbin 
(1998:12) puts it: “In this method, data collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in 
close relationship to one another”. The main difference from inductive analysis is that the 
theory is not to be proven, but developed or discovered through the research. In grounded 
theory, coding together with constant comparison are the central processes for analyzing 
data. Coding is the part where data is divided into components that are labeled and 
organized. Coding of data begins as soon as data has been collected. Constant comparison 
between data makes it possible to find patterns and put these patterns into concepts. As 
concepts are being built, they are used to construct categories. A category is something that 
represents a phenomenon relevant to the research. With coding of new data and 
comparison with the already obtained data, concepts and categories might have to be 
redefined and as categories develops a theory from these categories starts to emerge 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). Since perceptions of key component and patterns from the 
research might be subjective, it’s important to keep an open mind and try to avoid adding 
personal values when using the principles from grounded theory (Crowther and Lancaster, 
2012). The following two sub-chapters will provide a description of how analysis by 
categorization was used in this research project. 
2.4.1 How data were coded 
Immediately after the interviews, the empirical findings (presented in chapter four) were put 
into basic concepts, called tier 1 categories. The tier 1 categories consisted of concepts 
relevant for the research project that the interviewee put a lot of attention to or mentioned 
several times during the interview. By comparison of the field notes from both interviewers 
and by discussing the interview shortly after finishing it, such concepts could quite clearly be 
identified. This procedure was followed for all interviews and the resulting tier 1 categories 
are presented in the leftmost column in Appendix 1. For a more coherent presentation of 
the interviews, see chapter four. 
2.4.2 How data were analyzed 
After the initial process of creating tier 1 categories according to the within-case analysis 
described above, the process of transforming the categories from tier 1 to tier 2 was started. 
Tier 2 categories were formed by a cross-case comparison in which the relations between 
the tier 1 categories from the different interviews were compared and clustered. For 
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example, it was learned in case 1 that the complementary technologies in the merging parts 
had several benefits for R&D, although it was mentioned that synergies for R&D were 
actually larger for SKF’s subsequent acquisitions, which had slightly more of a substitutive 
character. Case 2 saw benefits of both complementary and substitutive technologies from 
the M&A. Thus, the question of whether complementary- vs. substitutive technologies 
M&As gave the most synergies was not obvious, although much attention been given to it in 
both interviews wherefore it interesting to study further. Thus, a tier 2 category called 
complementary- vs. substitutive technologies was formed following the cross-case analysis. 
Following the categorization of the empirical findings, the tier 2 categories were subjected to 
a comparison to the literature as can also be seen in Appendix 1. From this analysis, the tier 
2 categories were transformed to tier 3 categories, which are more thoroughly explained in 
chapter five. Continuing with the example above, by putting the findings from the literature 
on top of the empirical findings, it was found that in a study by Cassiman et al. (2005), 
complementary technologies use to give the most R&D synergies. However, a mix of 
complementary and substitutive technology relatedness between the merging parts seems 
to be the best. In this case, the final analysis showed that it was not a matter of 
complementarity or substitutivity, instead there should be a mix of the two in an adequate 
dose. The category was therefore renamed to its final form by calling it: “The right mix of 
technology relatedness”. 
The same procedure was used for the remaining categories; an overview of this can be seen 
in Appendix 1 and is described in more detail in chapter five. The result of this categorization 
process is presented in Table 1 below. It shall be noted that some categories were not 
compared to the literature since the literature review did not cover these topics. However, 
they are still interesting to consider on a purely empirical basis and has therefore been 
included as tier 3 categories. Additionally, some tier 1 categories that did not have 
resemblance in the other cases were removed. 
  
 12 
Table 1 - The categories developed during the case studies and literature review 
Category Explanation Sources of data 
The right mix of 
technology relatedness 
There seems to be most synergies from M&As of companies with 
an adequate mix of complementary and substitutive technological 
relatedness 
(Cassiman et al., 2005) 
Case 1, Case 2 
Synergies, economies of 
scale and scope 
Synergies can come in many forms for R&D following an M&A. A 
mix of all of them seems most common 
(Cassiman et al., 2005) 
(Pike and Neale, 2009) 
(Ulrich and Eppinger, 2011) 
Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 
Geographically 
dispersed R&D 
It seems rare to move existing R&D centers. Cross-border M&As 
therefore leads to a geographically spread R&D which has both 
positive and negative implications 
(Eppinger and Chitkara, 
2006) 
Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 
Where in the PD process 
can synergies be 
achieved? 
Different views of where the most synergies in the PD process 
following an M&A can be found were given by the case studies. It 
was theorized that it might relate to differences in technology 
relatedness between the M&As 
Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 
 
Harmonizing different 
working procedures 
The most prominent post-merger integration problem in the case 
studies was converging the technological and managerial working 
procedures. 
(Hitt et al., 2001) 
Case 2, Case 3 
Employee retention Although not a problem in the studied cases. Since many synergies 
for R&D post M&A originates in the combination of different 
knowledge, losing key employees post M&A decreases the chance 
of achieving such synergies 
(Walsh and Ellwood, 1991) 
(Ranft and Lord, 2000) 
Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 
Unused synergies Case 3 showed a PMI problem in which possible synergies were 
not used due to a failure of the acquiring firm to show where 
existing knowledge in the new entity was located. 
Case 3 
 
2.5 Credibility, Dependability, Confirmability and Transferability. 
As the structure of a qualitative report differs from a quantitative, Bryman and Bell (2011) 
presents an alternative way of evaluating validity and reliability by Guba and Lincoln (1989), 
better suited for the qualitative approach: trustworthiness and authenticity. Trustworthiness 
is divided into credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability as described 
below. 
Credibility is the counterpart to validity and the evaluating part referring to if the findings in 
the gathered data are credible or not (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). Three interviews have been 
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done in this report; Swedish was spoken in all of them. In order to keep translation mistakes 
and / or misunderstandings to a minimum, each of the authors took notes separately and 
also let the interviewees review and correct eventual mistakes in the empirical findings in 
chapter four of this report. Moreover, secondary data was compared to the findings in the 
interview in order to assess the validity of the findings. 
Transferability is a criterion for into what extent the findings can be transferred and used in 
a different environment. A qualitative method with a small amount of interviews results in 
that conclusions drawn from the samples obtained are insufficient to stand as a conclusion 
for the whole population. To add transferability, the researcher must add an as complete 
data base as possible, known as thick description (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). Although three 
case studies might be insufficient to build a commonly transferable theory on their own, 
similar findings in other studies might help to form a wider perspective of the population 
and help confirm or reject other studies done in the same area of research. The findings 
should be used for future comparison and as a means to deepen the current research in the 
field. Transferability is also limited by the fact that only technology-oriented firms have been 
studied in this report. 
Dependability is the qualitative counterpart to reliability. The idea is that all data obtained in 
the research process should be kept and then audited by peer/peers. This is done to keep 
the research trustworthy through all stages (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). A supervisor has 
overlooked the report and the authors have defended the report in an opposition performed 
by a group of two students in the same class. Secondary data is readily available in 
databases. Field notes from the interviews were stored, although taping and line-by-line 
transcribing were not performed because, as described by (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007:276), 
they are tedious to perform and can compared to field notes increase the risk of losing focus 
on what is really happening. 
Confirmability is the criteria of objectivity. As it is not possible for a human being to stay 
completely objective, subjectivity will affect how data is looked upon and analyzed (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1989). Confirmability applies to the findings of the authors of this report, not 
the interviewees in the case studies, since the purpose of the interviews was to capture 
precisely personal opinions and experiences. To reach an as high level of objectivity as 
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possible towards the collection of data from the interviews, leading questions were avoided 
and the interviewees were encouraged to speak their mind freely. Since an inductive 
approach with grounded theory as analyzing tool was used in this report, the author should 
start the research assumption free and try to avoid adding personal values. As with 
objectivity, this is not possible to completely achieve but being aware of this main problem 
with the inductive approach helps to avoid this to an as large extent as possible 
Authenticity deals with the general fairness and the political impact the research might have. 
Fairness is reached by representing viewpoints from different hierarchical levels (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). The interviews performed in this study were held with persons that today 
have high-ranking managerial positions in large firms. However, some of them held positions 
in lower hierarchical levels during the time of the M&A. This allowed them to see the M&A 
from different hierarchical perspectives, which gives fairness to the findings of the report. To 
improve fairness, persons from different hierarchical levels in the same firm could be 
interviewed. Due to time restraints, it was decided not to do so and instead focus on 
collecting data from a broader set of firms in order to allow cross-case comparison. 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
This chapter presents the theoretical data that has been collected in the literature review 
performed during the study. Initially, present research about the effects on R&D following 
M&As is presented. Thereafter more in depth data from the separate fields of M&As and 
R&D is presented in different sub-chapters. 
Although the amount of research performed on M&As is vast, the focus of such studies does 
rarely seem to be on R&D aspects. In a study by Zollo and Meier (2008) one can see that in 
comparison to other aspects such as financial- and accounting performance, innovation 
performance is indeed understudied. The existing studies in the field are rather inconclusive 
and contradicting. Most try to measure the R&D performance before and after an M&A. 
R&D performance is measured in different ways in the studies which makes it hard to get a 
coherent view of the effects on R&D post M&A. Even though the existing literature is 
inconclusive and sometimes even confusing it is relevant to refer to in this report in order to 
give an overview of the subject and to use as comparison to the findings in the performed 
interviews. 
In a study on foreign acquisitions of innovative French manufacturing companies Bertrand 
(2009) found a positive and significant effect on R&D spending post M&A and that efficiency 
gains may outweigh the various costs of e.g. post-merger integration. Bertrand’s results 
were reproduced in a similar study by (Miyazaki, 2009). He found that there existed a 
positive correlation between R&D spending and M&As in Japanese high-tech firms which 
suggested that the firms did expect to obtain synergies from the M&As. With Miyazaki and 
Bertrand’s results in mind it is somewhat surprising to see a significant negative correlation 
between R&D spending and a firm’s propensity to invest in M&As. A large study of American 
firms between 1985-1993 by Blonigen and Taylor (2000) showed just that and further 
suggested that technology firms can grow in two modes; by internal R&D or by acquisitions. 
In another report by Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) it was investigated how cross-border M&As 
affected R&D investments in OECD countries. The study showed a weak influence of M&A on 
R&D investment and is thus contradicting to Bertrand’s later study performed in 2009 as 
mentioned above. 
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In a study of firms’ technological performance, Valentini (2012) studied patenting behavior 
of firms in the American medical devices and photographic equipment industry before and 
after M&As. The results showed that patent quantity increased after the M&A, but the 
quality measured by the patents’ impact, generality and originality decreased. The findings 
suggest that a pressure for immediate results following the M&A could be the reason for the 
decreased quality of the patents. 
In a widely cited article by Cassiman et al. (2005) they present several possible consequences 
on R&D post M&A of which some are: Economies of scale can theoretically be achieved by 
spreading the costs over more output and by eliminating common inputs for production, 
although according to Cassiman et al. (2005) it was not applicable for R&D. Economies of 
scope is the result of the new entity’s lower cost of development of two products compared 
to if the two firms developed one product each. Synergies from the fusion of different 
knowledge and technology make projects feasible that were not feasible for the separate 
companies and thus increase the incentive to invest in R&D. By the knowledge transfer and 
its effect on the R&D organization, the new entity can attain a critical mass in a broader 
product portfolio that results in improved R&D. Technology market power, by securing 
technology the new entity can create barriers to entry for other firms and thus gain a 
competitive advantage. The effects on R&D from M&As differ whether the merging firms’ 
technologies are complementary or substitutive and if the firms are rivals or not. Other 
interesting findings were that complementary technology firms achieve stronger synergies 
from M&A compared to substitutive technology firms, and non-rival firms are better suited 
for M&As than rival firms (Cassiman et al., 2005). 
After an M&A it is common for the companies to face increased employee turnover. Walsh 
and Ellwood (1991) showed that after the two first years following an M&A, 39 % of the top 
managers had left the company, compared to 15 % in companies not involved in an M&A. 
Increased employee retention is not limited to top management, Ranft and Lord (2000) 
argues that retention of other key personnel such as R&D employees can be more directly 
related to post M&A performance. In a study of M&As in high-tech firms, Ranft and Lord 
(2000) stressed the importance of retaining key personnel in order to transfer tacit 
knowledge between the merging firms, which is of vital importance for whether the M&A 
turns out successfully or not. 
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3.1 M&A in a historical perspective  
Mergers and Acquisitions have historically come in wave-shaped patterns, which mean that 
each period starts with a few M&As that rapidly increases until it peaks to then hastily cease.  
The reason to this phenomenon still puzzles scholars and even though the amount of 
research on the topic is considered to be vast, no broadly accepted theory explaining why 
M&A appears in waves currently exists (Ribeiro, 2010).  
 A total of seven M&A waves have been defined. The first five waves of M&As has been 
described by Weston and Weaver (2001), and the more recent sixth and indications of a 
current seventh wave by McCarthy and Dolfsma (2012). The first wave occurred around the 
19th century. In U.S this wave was dominated by horizontal, i.e. inter-industry, M&As. The 
second wave occurred after WWI and lasted until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1929. 
Innovations such as the automobile and radio made vertical M&As more common as 
companies wanted to control the distribution channels when national broadcasting became 
possible. The third wave happened in the 1960s and became a wave of diversification. The 
fourth wave in the 1980s was characterized by hostile takeovers. The fifth wave started in 
the mid-1990s and ended somewhere around the year of 2001. It was by far the largest 
wave so far and consisted of around 87,000 deals compared to the fourth wave with around 
10,000.  The sixth wave came in-between two large recessions, from 2003 until 2008. An 
indication of a more globalized world might be that this was first wave not lead by the U.S 
market, but by European one. The most recent wave started in 2010 but some data 
indicated that it ended quickly, already in 2011 or 2012. However, with countries like China, 
India, Brazil and Russia on an aggressive economic growth, it seems like a seventh wave is 
either still on-going or soon to come (McCarthy and Dolfsma, 2012). 
3.2 Why companies choose M&A  
According to Ross et al. (2005), there are three types of M&As: Horizontal M&A, which is a 
deal between two firms within the same industry. Vertical M&A, defined as a deal between 
two firms which are operating at different levels in the production line, and conglomerate 
M&A, where two firms operating in different industries and/or at different levels in the 
production line.  
 18 
Economies of scale, company size, and market power are all repeated motives for entering 
an M&A (Damodaran, 2002; Pike and Neale, 2009; Kang and Sakai, 2001; Coeurdacier et al., 
2009; Goldberg, 1983). The advantage of economies of scale is that costs per unit can be 
reduced with a larger unit output. Size could be “Critical mass”, i.e. size needed be able to 
survive in a market, e.g. a certain percentage of the market share is necessary to be able to 
compete in a long term view. Size could also be the possibility of getting listed on the stock 
market. Market power could be used for forcing competitors to exit the market and to 
create an oligopoly or monopoly.  
Other discussed motives are economies of scope (Kang and Sakai, 2001; Coeurdacier et al., 
2009), financial benefits (Damodaran, 2002), entrance to new market, cost of new product 
development (Hitt et al., 2001), and improved growth (Pike and Neale, 2009). Economies of 
scope are similar to economies of scale but refer to a company lowering their average 
production costs for two or more products. Financial motives could be e.g. to reduce 
taxation by restructuring a firm to be able to exploit differences in tax laws between 
countries, or increased debt possibilities because of the increased revenue for the new firm. 
Entrance to new market is a strategy where green field investment is seen as too risky and 
M&A seems as the best alternative. In some countries, such as China, M&A might be the 
only option to gain access to a market. To develop a new product could be both expensive 
and time-consuming. Thus, a company with a large budget and possibly a longer time 
perspective might improve the odds to a successful product development. The motive of 
improved growth includes companies in stagnated markets or markets expected to stagnate 
and look to grow further through M&A.  
It should be noted that some of the motives are quite similar to each other, e.g. obtain stock 
market listing and to reach critical mass might in some cases be the same thing, and depends 
on the authors’ different definition. 
A Statistics research by Tiemann (2008) analyzing the stock price one and two years after 
M&A deals in 510 cases found that the motive for the deal had an impact on the stock value. 
Firms with the motive to increase their financial strength had an average increase of their 
stock price by 6.7% increase after one year and by 16.8% after two years after the deal.  
Firms motivated by increasing their distribution channels saw an average increase 5.7% the 
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first year and 17.8% after two years. The motivation that scored the lowest was firms with 
the simple motive of increase earnings with an average of 5.4% and 16.5% respectively. The 
study also found that smaller companies involved in few deals were more successful, in 
terms of stock price, than larger firms. 
3.3 OLI  
Many reasons and rationale for why companies enter M&A have been presented but any 
final conclusion seems to be hard to state (Steger and Kummer, 2007). The OLI-framework 
can be used to explain what is necessary for a firm to be able to expand and why they 
sometimes choose to do so through M&A (Samad, 2009). The model has been modified over 
the years and Dunning and Lundan (2008) elaborated the OLI paradigm to better capture the 
international perspective  
The OLI-framework consists of the O, ownership-specific advantages. These advantages are 
put into three different categories. Oa, which is the property rights e.g. production 
innovation or production management. Complementary assets, Ot, such as economies of 
scale or market control. Oi, institutional assets, that is assets such as corporate culture and 
leadership. Localization-specific advantages, L. If a company is localized in two countries they 
may use differences in tax system or labor cost. Localization advantages also include access 
to markets and region specific resources.  Internalization advantages I.  When keeping 
production inside your own firm you can keep control of the production line. Thus avoid 
being a victim of e.g. suppliers breaking a contract or run bankrupt. To internalize is useful 
when a firm wants to secure its owner-specific advantage, e.g. a patented product, and not 
take the risk of letting an outside firm take part in the production.  If a company finds that 
they can find all of these advantages abroad, then Foreign Direct Investment, FDI, is 
recommended. However, if a company finds themselves with only one or two advantages, 
the ownership advantage is always required, then licensing or simply exporting is to be 
preferred as this approach is less costly and thus less risky (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
3.4 Successful M&A  
As discussed in the problematization, numerous authors find high failure rates in the case of 
M&As. Since that is the case, what then characterize a successful M&A? To be able to find 
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and utilize synergy effects, that the merger/acquired firm is complementary in either 
resources or assets, that the acquisition is of friendly nature, and that the acquiring firm 
sustains and focus on R&D are four key elements for a successful M&A (Hitt et al., 2001; 
Samad, 2009). Additionally, Hitt et al. (2001) describes four key components to create 
synergy: strategic fit, organizational fit, managerial actions, and value creation. Strategic fit is 
when the post M&A-company is able to match organizational capabilities such as e.g. 
combined R&D or marketing. Organizational fit refers to the ability to manage to merge the 
cultures, system and structure to facilitate learning from each other’s experiences and 
communication. Managerial actions are required to complement strategic and 
organizational fit. Value creation is when investment in exploiting in synergies is exceeded 
by the gains from those synergies. 
3.5 The importance of product development for business success 
In today’s increasingly competitive business environment, product development capability is 
a requirement for a firm’s success. The driving forces behind the growing importance of PD 
are identified by Wheelwright and Clark (1992) as: Intense international competition; The 
globalized business environment has increased the number of competitors and the diversity 
of firms due to different national cultures etc., which has resulted in a less forgiving business 
environment. Fragmented, demanding markets; Customer tastes have become increasingly 
sophisticated and diverse. High demand on performance and reliability is accompanied by 
the importance of user friendliness and intuitive products. Diverse and rapidly changing 
technologies; the growing breadth and depth of technical knowledge create new and diverse 
opportunities to meet customer requirement, but also has the potential to make existing 
products obsolete at an instant. 
Sorli and Stokic (2009) present similar conclusions regarding the driving forces of PD but 
with an added point: Legal regulations in the form of e.g. safety- and environmental 
legislation are becoming more and more numerous. Ulrich and Eppinger (2011) argues that 
the ability to identify customer needs and then quickly design, produce and market products 
that meet those requirements at a low cost is what defines most firms’ success. The 
importance of PD is present in most markets, not only in technically dynamic industries but 
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also in mature market with long product lifecycles, for example the textile industry 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). 
3.6 The characteristic product development process 
Product development is an interdisciplinary activity where in particular three business 
functions collaborate; marketing, design / engineering and manufacturing. The generic PD 
process can be divided in 6 steps presented by Ulrich and Eppinger (2011): 1, a planning 
phase in which opportunities are identified and development goals, constraints and 
assumptions are set. 2, a concept development phase, often called the “front end process”. 
In this phase customer needs are identified and several product concepts are generated and 
funneled down to the most promising one. 3, a System level design phase where the 
architecture of the product is developed, and an initial production process is defined. 4, a 
detailed design phase in which all parts of the product are developed and ready for 
manufacturing. 5, testing and refinement of the design is performed before the start of 
production in order to ensure that the goals of the product are fulfilled and shortcomings 
are improved. 6, the last step of the PD process is the production ramp up where the 
production system is finalized and the workforce trained to produce the product as 
efficiently as possible. Similar descriptions are given by both Wheelwright and Clark (1992) 
and Sorli and Stokic (2009). 
3.7 What is successful Product Development? 
According to Wheelwright and Clark (1992) there are three competitive imperatives for 
successful product development: A fast and responsive development process is needed in 
order to handle intense competition, changing customer tastes and technological change. 
High development productivity enabled diverse products to be developed for the 
increasingly diverse customer tastes. Products with distinction and integrity are required to 
be competitive on a crowded market and attract customer attention. 
The profitability of the developed products is what defines PD success according to (Ulrich 
and Eppinger, 2011). To assess profitability, they use five different dimensions: Product 
quality, manufacturing cost, development time, development cost and development 
capability / company learning. 
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3.8 Organizing Product Development 
Several theories on how to organize PD in an organization have been developed over time. 
Organization by Cross-functional teams has long been considered a best practice for many 
applications, although the theory has recently been challenged by the new trend of Global 
Product Development (GPD). 
By 2000, a widely accepted best practice for organizing PD was the use of co-located cross-
functional teams (Eppinger and Chitkara, 2006). Wheelwright and Clark (1992) propose that 
in dynamic markets where a short time to market is a critical success factor for PD, cross-
functional integration is of vital importance. By Cross-functional integration, Wheelwright 
and Clark mean a solid cooperation between the engineering-, marketing- and 
manufacturing department of a firm. True cross-functional integration rests not on company 
structures and working procedures but on inter-personal and inter-group relations based on 
a dependency of one another and on good communication. The need for cross-functional 
integration in PD is also mentioned by Hill (2010) where he stresses that cross-functional 
integration is a way for companies to reduce the rather high failure rate of PD. By co-
location of cross-functional teams several different development activities can be performed 
simultaneously in an efficient way. By using such concurrent approach to PD; better designs, 
shorter lead times and lower manufacturing costs could be achieved (Eppinger and Chitkara, 
2006). 
A recent new trend in Product development is the use of Global Product Development 
(GPD). GPD is a stark contrast to co-located teams since it instead uses a highly distributed, 
networked and digital development process (Eppinger and Chitkara, 2006). Using foreign PD 
is not new in itself, in a study from 1997, it was shown that American and Japanese 
companies used FDI to develop a decentralized PD organizations in order to meet local 
customer needs (Greaney, 1997). However, GPD is not only about meeting local customer 
needs, Eppinger and Chitkara (2006) has found four primary reasons for building GPD 
capabilities: Lower cost: There is today a large pool of talented engineers in countries with 
significantly lower wages than in for example the US. Countries like India, China and Vietnam 
are some examples. Improved Process: Much of the world’s production is nowadays located 
in low wage countries. By locating parts of the development process at the manufacturing 
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site, some of the same benefits of using co-located cross-functional teams can be achieved. 
Global growth: Better response to local customer tastes. Technology access: By using a 
globally dispersed development network, local specialty knowledge can be captured. 
Eppinger and Chitkara (2006) identify three basic approaches for GPD: Process outsourcing is 
the outsourcing of certain parts or processes of the development cycle, for example tooling 
design or translation of technical documents. Component outsourcing: For products that can 
be modularized or decomposed into subsystems it is possible to outsource the complete 
development of some modules or parts. Captive design center: Contrary to just outsourcing 
PD activities, a wholly owned foreign development center can be used, which of course is 
more complex alternative. The captive design center approach is the most similar one to 
what happens after an international M&A, where the new organization own development 
centers in different countries. 
Implementing GPD is accompanied with a learning curve and several years of commitment 
for the GPD process to run smoothly. Eppinger and Chitkara (2006) provide a list of key 
success factors for implementing GPD of which the most relevant for this study are: 
Management priority: The executive team must show a strong commitment to the success 
of GPD and be ready to endure “worse-before-better” performance of the PD organization. 
Product and process modularity: It must be possible to segregate the work in a clear way. 
Data quality: There must be no confusion on what data is the most recent and valid one and 
the data must be available for globally dispersed teams. Governance and Project 
Management: Management of the PD is a larger challenge when the team is not co-located 
which makes clear goals and planning etc. even more important than for conventional PD. 
Collaborative culture: Trust is equally important for GPD as for conventional PD. Trust is 
developed over time and requires a consistent set of processes and standards. Bi-directional 
travel has proven to be an important tool to build trust. 
3.9 Theoretical conclusions 
The underlying motive/motives for M&A have an impact on how well it turns out (Tiemann, 
2008). Common motives are Economies of scale, company size and market power 
(Damodaran, 2002; Pike and Neale, 2009; Kang and Sakai, 2001; Coeurdacier et al., 2009; 
Goldberg, 1983). Also, cost of product development (Hitt et al., 2001), economies of scope 
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(Kang and Sakai, 2001, Coeurdacier et al., 2009), and improved growth (Pike and Neale, 
2009). The OLI-framework explains what attributes are needed to expand at all: Ownership-, 
Location- and Internalization specific advantages. If a company has Ownership-specific 
advantages combined with Location and/or Internalization advantages, then FDI is 
recommended (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). In this study, location advantages were found to 
be of importance for R&D in cross-border M&As. 
Because of the high failure rate of M&As, it is important to know the characteristics found in 
a successful M&A in order to lessen the risk of M&A failure. To be able to find and utilize 
synergy effect is one of four key components. To create synergy effects is split into strategic 
fit, organizational fit, managerial actions and value creation. The second component is that 
the two firms are complementary in either resources or assets.  That the merger/acquisition 
is of a non-hostile nature is the third key component. The last key component that 
characterizes a successful M&A is that the acquiring firm focuses on, and sustains R&D (Hitt 
et al., 2001; Samad, 2009). 
Product development is a process with long lead times and a vast amount of activities that 
needs to be coordinated. As shown by Ulrich and Eppinger (2011) the beginning of the 
process is characterized by creativity and is thereafter becoming increasingly rigid. To 
manage this complex activity, several theories have been developed. Cross-functional teams, 
described by Wheelwright and Clark (1992) were long consider best practice, although the 
theory has recently been challenged by that of global product development (GPD), described 
by Eppinger and Chitkara (2006). The major difference between the two is that GPD uses a 
geographically dispersed set of R&D engineers, whereas cross-functional are co-located. By 
cross-border M&As, the result is often a geographically scattered R&D organization, which 
resembles that of GPD. The benefits of GPD are described by Eppinger and Chitkara (2006) 
as access to local labor and knowledge clusters, possibilities to locate R&D close to 
production facilities and better response to local tastes. The drawback is impaired 
cooperation between the engineers due to the long distances, which necessitates the use of 
IT-tools and thereby losing some possibilities of establishing personal relations between the 
engineers, which is described as important by both Wheelwright and Clark (1992) and 
Eppinger and Chitkara (2006). 
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4 Empirical data 
This chapter presents the companies and the M&As in the case studies. The empirical 
findings are presented in a summary of the field notes taken from each interview. One 
participating company asked for full anonymity and will therefore not be presented. 
4.1 Description of case 1: SKF-Willy Vogel and SKF-Lincoln 
The first case study was performed on the Swedish MNC SKF, founded in 1907. The company 
now operates in more than 130 countries and has almost 47 000 employees. SKF was initially 
a producer of bearings but has since then expanded the product portfolio significantly and 
now divides its technologies in five platforms: Bearings and units, seals, mechatronics, 
services and lubrication systems (SKF, 2013). In 2012, SKF spent SEK 1607m on R&D 
expenses, about 2.5 % of the net sales of SEK 64,575m (SKF, 2012). SKF has been involved in 
numerous acquisitions. In this report the studied acquisitions will be limited to a number of 
acquisitions of firms in the lubrication industry. With the purchase of Willy Vogel, 
hereinafter called Vogel, in 2004, SKF added a new product platform to its portfolio. Vogel 
was a German company with an annual turnover of around 1 billion SEK and 940 employees. 
The company was headquartered in Germany with production in France, USA, Germany and 
Japan. Prior to the purchase, SKF sold lubrication system products for about SEK 200m 
annually. For SKF the purchase of Vogel was motivated by acquiring increased knowledge in 
automated lubrication systems, becoming a global supplier in lubrication and by increasing 
customer value in SKF’s products. Vogel saw possibilities to reach new customers and 
segments by SKF’s global presence (SKF, 2004). Since the purchase of Vogel, SKF has 
acquired a number of other firms in the lubrication industry, the most recent one being the 
American firm Lincoln in 2010. Lincoln had 2000 employees and expected annual net sales of 
USD 400m. Lincoln is headquartered in USA and has sales and production in North America, 
Europe and Asia, production was based in Asia and North America. SKF’s motives for the 
acquisition were improvement of the lubrication system platform by complementing the 
current product portfolio with only minor overlap, increased presence in North America and 
Asia, increased business in America’s automotive industry and increased production by 
Lincoln’s strong position in USA and Asia (SKF, 2010). 
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4.2 Empirical findings from case 1 
The first acquisition of Willy Vogel was a way for SKF to expand its business areas by 
expanding around the core business. Although SKF had some research on lubrication prior to 
the acquisition, it was perceived as providing SKF with complementary technology rather 
than substitutive. The following acquisitions including Lincoln further strengthened SKF’s 
new business area. Although both Lincoln and Vogel were companies in the lubrication 
systems business, their technological overlap was rather small. Vogel mainly produced 
lubrication system products based on oil, whereas Lincoln primarily sold grease-based 
products. Therefore, the acquisition of Lincoln could still be seen as mostly bringing 
complementary technology to SKF. 
The interviewee described the integration following both acquisitions as very successful and 
mentioned some points that he believed important for the smooth integration. SKF were 
very clear about what the acquisition would lead to for the acquired firms already in the 
acquisition process. A well-considered plan for organizing the new entity was considered 
important and SKF also made sure to include persons from the acquired firms in the 
management team of the new entity. These actions created a positive attitude towards the 
acquisition. It was also considered of vital importance of SKF to listen to requests and 
proposals of the acquired firms and not do too large changes immediately following the 
acquisitions, which was metaphorically described as not to act as “an elephant in a porcelain 
shop”. Along with SKF’s rather slow and careful approach to the integration, the well-
defined goals and positive attitudes created a clear integration-path that could be followed 
without inducing any shocks to the new organization. 
After the acquisition of Lincoln, some technological overlap existed that led to double work. 
For successfully merging the companies it was perceived important to harmonize the 
product offers in order to create one SKF product line. To do so, an auditing of the 
components that were produced by both companies was performed in order to choose 
which ones that should be kept. This harmonization process is still ongoing, SKF has made 
good progress and eventually no double work will be performed. Distinctive leadership, new 
organization structures and a clear plan were perceived important to succeed with this 
harmonization process. The only mentioned problem to integrating the companies was that 
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the ownership structure changed for the acquired firms. Before the acquisitions, neither 
Lincoln nor Vogel were publicly listed companies. It took some time for managers of the 
acquired firms to get used to being part of the publicly listed company SKF. 
When asked about synergies for R&D from the M&As the interviewee described that for an 
old and rather stable company like SKF it could be beneficial to widen the scope of 
knowledge in order to get a more coherent view of the industry. By acquiring 
complementary technology in the lubrication systems industry, SKF acquired new knowledge 
and R&D employees with new solutions and ideas. The widened scope of knowledge 
increased the R&D creativity. This had positive impacts on the initial parts of the R&D 
process where idea generation is the central activity, thus increasing the innovativeness of 
the company. Another synergy that was described was that the new entity reached a critical 
mass, which enabled R&D projects that would have been infeasible for the firms to perform 
on their own. The increased scope of knowledge combined with the critical mass enabled 
new products to be developed. For example; by combining SKF’s knowledge of mechatronics 
and automation and the acquired firms’ knowledge of lubrication system products, new 
automated lubrication systems could be developed and sold successfully. It would have been 
significantly more expensive for either part to develop such systems by themselves. Scale 
economies for R&D could not be commented on since that had not been a goal with the 
M&As. 
Prior to the acquisitions, SKF had its R&D for lubrication based in the Netherlands, Vogel in 
Germany and Lincoln in USA. None of these R&D centers were moved following the M&As. 
However, smaller R&D centers in China and India were consolidated to larger R&D centers 
with inputs from all of the merging parts. Thus, following the acquisitions; SKF’s R&D in 
lubrication was geographically dispersed on a global level. Cooperation between the 
different R&D centers is enabled by the use of IT tools, which works well. It was described 
that most products were of a modular character, which allowed the R&D centers to focus 
their research on different modules of the product. Such modular product design was used 
by SKF prior to the acquisitions, but the benefits could perhaps be more evident when the 
R&D became more geographically dispersed. Benefits of having R&D in different areas of the 
world consisted of the ability to capture local tastes / requirements and to get access to 
 28 
knowledge clusters, both were important to SKF. The growing supply of skilled engineers in 
India was mentioned as one example.  
The reason for not moving the R&D centers in Europe and USA was that the risk for losing 
key employees was perceived smaller by keeping them where they were. It was stressed 
that employee retention was of vital importance. Since the acquired knowledge exists in the 
form of skilled employees, that knowledge would be lost if they left the company. No 
problems with key people leaving the company following the studied M&As had been 
experienced, which could be explained by the fact that SKF made sure not to proceed too 
fast and bluntly with the integration of the acquired firms in order for the staff to accept the 
new ownership. The interviewee did however have some experience of past M&As where 
key employees had left the new entity shortly after the M&As. He perceived the problem to 
be larger for acquisitions of really small and entrepreneurial firms because they could not 
adapt to the increased bureaucracy in the much larger new entity. 
4.3 Description of case 2: FMC-VCC 
The second case study was performed on Ford Motor Company’s (FMC)’s acquisition of 
Volvo Car Corporation (VCC) in 1999. The Swedish company Volvo started off as a subsidiary 
to SKF with production of automobiles in 1927. Production of trucks started one year later 
and Volvo was subsequently divested from SKF. Nowadays Volvo Group is one of the global 
giants in trucks, Volvo Group signed a deal with the Chinese firm Dongfeng in Janauary 2013, 
which will make them the largest heavy truck manufacturer in the world. Volvo Group also 
produces e.g. buses and construction equipment (Volvo, 2013). FMC is an American MNC 
and one of the world’s largest car manufacturers with a total of 166 000 employees as of 
2013. Ford was founded in 1903 by Henry Ford and in addition to cars, also produces a 
variety of vehicles, for example trucks (Ford, 2013). In 1999, Volvo Group sold off their share 
in VCC for SEK 50 billion to FMC. At the time, VCC had an above average profit per year 
(Volvo, 1999). The deal took place in the fifth so-called M&A wave. During an on-going 
consolidation phase in the automobile industry, FMC sought to increase their brand 
portfolio. FMC added VCC into their premium automotive group and planned to use VCC’s 
technological strengths such as security. VCC, on the other hand, thought that economies of 
scale were required in order to develop new cars and saw possibilities for that by merging 
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with FMC (Lundbäck, 2002). In 2010, after several years of losses for VCC and at the same 
time, the whole industry being hit hard by the recession, FMC sold VCC to the Chinese 
company Geely for about SEK 13 billion (USD 1.8 billion), a loss of about SEK 37 billion 
compared to the amount FMC paid to acquire VCC eleven years earlier (Economist, 2010). 
The sale of VCC occurred as FMC chose to reconstruct the firm to focus on their main brand; 
Ford. 
4.4 Empirical findings from case 2 
In the very cost-competitive automotive industry, FMC’s acquisition of VCC lead to scale 
economies for R&D by spreading the very large platform development costs on a larger 
number of car models. Prior to being acquired by FMC, VCC used one platform for four car 
models, after the M&A, this number was increased to 16. However, such strategy also 
increased the complexity of the platform development. Both because of technological 
challenges of making the platform so versatile that it could be used on 16 models, and also 
due to the fact that the R&D now had to be done by international cooperation between 
FMC’s subsidiaries. Platform development for so many car models requires very large 
upfront R&D costs, but has the possibility to lead to even larger cost savings during 
production. However, the time from R&D to production can be rather long and perseverance 
is therefore required until the investments start to pay off. 
Although VCC and FMC operated in the same industry, the acquisition did not only give FMC 
substitutive technology. Complementary technology in certain areas of expertise was also 
transferred between the different subsidiaries in the new entity. VCC for example was used 
as a center of excellence for safety. Following the M&A, FMC used VCC’s expertise in safety 
by conducting crash tests for several of their brands in VCC’s test facility in Gothenburg. FMC 
on the other hand was skilled in for example chassis and engineer to cost. By using 
knowledge from different centers of excellence, economies of scope could be achieved for 
the new entity. Since different subsidiaries of FMC specialized in different areas of R&D, the 
relative R&D efficiencies differed in different technology-areas and subsidiaries. For 
example, the relative R&D efficiency in safety was better in VCC than in any other subsidiary 
of FMC, therefore it was most worthwhile to allocate FMC’s investments on safety-R&D to 
VCC. Since FMC could allocate its R&D investments to the different subsidiaries according to 
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their R&D strengths, and then combine the R&D outputs to the entire entity, FMC could 
increase the overall R&D efficiency. The interviewee saw synergies for R&D following the 
acquisition in a large part of the R&D process. The increased scope of knowledge improved 
creativity that could be used in the early R&D-stages and as previously described, different 
areas of R&D strengths in the new entity could be used for both system level- and detailed 
design throughout the R&D process. 
The R&D centers were not moved following the acquisition although R&D knowledge was 
more clearly organized by geographically dispersed centers of excellence. In addition to the 
synergies mentioned above, such centers had benefits of being able to use local knowledge 
clusters, for example did Autoliv, Saab and VCC who were all skilled in car safety exist in a 
rather close proximity in Sweden. Another benefit of the centers of excellence was that they 
attracted top engineers to work there. In order to facilitate cooperation between the 
geographically dispersed knowledge centers a clear understanding of different technical 
interfaces was important. Telephone- and video meetings were very common, although the 
importance of engineers that worked together to at least having met face to face once was 
stressed as important in order to build trust and improve future cooperation. IT tools for 
R&D cooperation between the engineers were used; some initial problems with transferring 
technical files between the different subsidiaries in the new entity were experienced due to 
the use of different software. 
Project management practices also differed slightly between the firms. Both FMC and VCC 
used tollgate systems for their R&D, although the contents of the different gates differed 
somewhat. It was considered important to harmonize such working procedures in order for 
the different subsidiaries to “speak the same language” by for example agreeing on 
requirements for approval, engineering designations etc. A harmonization phase of 2-3 years 
was required until problems following such differences were reduced to a minimum. It was 
perceived that FMC did use a sensible approach for integration and did take VCC’s opinions 
into account. The integration process was allowed to take time and FMC considered 
personal contacts between the subsidiaries as important. The interviewee experienced no 
increased employee turnover. When asked about the amount of double work, i.e. 
development of the same parts by different subsidiaries of FMC, the interviewee mentioned 
that some double work was inevitable. In certain areas it was required in order to keep the 
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distinguishing characteristics between the different brands. However, for components not 
visible to the customer the goal was to use the same parts for all subsidiaries in FMC to an as 
large extent as possible as long as it did not negotiate the core attributes in the brand. In 
some cases, that goal was not reached. The interviewee could not give a definite answer to 
what caused this, although he speculated on a failure to agree on technology choices and a 
lack of personal relations, to be some of the reasons. 
When speculating about why FMC eventually decided to divest its investment in VCC, the 
interviewee mentioned that the acquisition had not been economically feasible to FMC and 
that they needed to focus upon recovering the performance of the Ford brand. It was 
discussed why other firms, most notable Volkswagen, had been more successful in their 
acquisitions. A hesitant answer to why Volkswagen had been more successful was that they 
had started their acquisitions much earlier, that their acquisitions had a better strategic fit 
and that they had more patience to wait for the cost savings discussed above. FMC acquired 
VCC rather late in a consolidation phase in the automotive industry, and might perhaps have 
focused slightly too much on quick wins. 
4.5 Description of case 3 
The final participating company in the case studies of this report requested to be 
anonymous and will therefore not be presented. The company operates in a different sector 
than VCC and SKF although still being technology oriented with a substantial amount of R&D. 
A foreign firm acquired the company not so many years ago and the integration phase of the 
M&A is still ongoing by the time of writing. 
4.6 Empirical findings from case 3 
The technology relatedness in case 3 was a mix of both complementary- and substitutive 
technologies, although complementarity dominated. The motivation for the deal was mostly 
based on widening the technology portfolio of the acquirer. Since the acquisition occurred 
quite recently, no economies of scope have yet been achieved from the widened knowledge. 
However, all participants in the interview expected such potentials to be utilized in the 
future. The increased size of the new entity was not expected to lead to any economies of 
scale. However, the acquisition increased R&D funding possibilities due to the larger size of 
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the new entity. The increased funding possibilities were not immediately available however; 
several interviewees described an increased need to thoroughly motivate investments in 
R&D to the acquiring company’s corporate division. Such requirements were perceived as 
slightly demotivating for R&D employees, although it was also experienced as a rather 
effective cost reduction method. 
The locations of the R&D centers were not changed following the acquisition, which resulted 
in a geographically dispersed research. The interviewees anticipated that the acquiring firm 
chose to keep the R&D centers where they were because of a fear of losing employees if 
they would have been moved. However, the geographically dispersed R&D did not facilitate 
good cooperation between the different centers. The integration process lacked any 
possibilities for R&D employees in the merging firms to meet each other and establish 
personal contacts. Further, it was not clear to the R&D employees where in the new entity 
that different knowledge could be found. Because of that, synergies from combining a wider 
scope of knowledge were effectively prevented. The most notable cooperation between the 
different parts of the new entity was that the top ranking R&D managers for each subsidiary 
had monthly meetings, which were perceived as very fruitful. Although the interviewees did 
not experience it enough to just integrate the highest hierarchical levels of the R&D 
organization. Integration of lower level managers or researchers was perceived as equally 
important to facilitate efficient cooperation between the different subsidiaries of the new 
entity. 
The interviewees described that the acquirer used a sensible and sensitive approach to the 
integration, the acquirer listened to the opinions of the acquired company and did not force 
any changes immediately following the M&A. No significant increase in employee turnover 
was noticed; no clear cases in which a person left purely because of the acquisition was 
mentioned. Some R&D employees found it emotionally hard to accept that R&D projects 
that they were involved in were scrapped due to different priorities of the new owner, 
though such experiences were described as inevitable. 
Differences in project management procedures were perceived as the biggest problem for 
integrating into the new entity. Having to adjust working procedures at the same time as 
showing economic feasibility of the R&D to the new owner required much effort from the 
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R&D employees. The new owner’s project management procedures were perceived as a 
downgrade to the current ones by many employees, which further reduced motivation for 
change. Also, the different subsidiaries in the new entity are rather different which makes it 
hard to use the same management procedures in the entire entity, which is the goal of the 
new owner. The reasonability of that goal was questioned by the interviewees. 
  
 34 
5 Data analysis and discussion 
In this chapter the empirical findings from the interview and the literature review are 
analyzed and discussed according to the research questions. The chapter is divided in the 
categories found by coding of the findings in both the interviews and the literature review. 
Hereinafter; the case study on SKF will be referred to as “case 1”, the FMC-VCC case as “case 
2” and the anonymous case will be “case 3”. 
5.1 The right mix of technology relatedness 
All case studies had some parts of both complementary and substitutive technology 
relatedness. Case 2 can predominantly be seen as a case of substitutive technology. 
However, during the interview it was found that the areas of expertise in the merging firms 
differed which lead to “complementary expert knowledge”. Thus, even though the merging 
entities are technologically substitutive, some amounts of complementary technology will 
also be acquired. The merging of complementary technologies in case 1 showed economies 
of scope by leveraging knowledge in different areas that could be combined and thus reach 
critical mass in new technological fields. Interestingly, such behavior is explicitly stated by 
Cassiman et al. (2005) as typical for complementary technology firms. In the quantitative 
study by Cassiman et al. (2005) stronger R&D efficiencies for technologically complementary 
firms than for substitutive ones was found. However, case 1 mentioned that the synergies 
for their second merger, which was slightly more substitutive than their first one, had more 
synergies for R&D. Several R&D efficiencies were also mentioned in case 2, which had many 
substitutive technologies. One might therefore question whether or not it is correct to say 
that complementary technology relatedness is preferable to substitutive technologies for 
R&D efficiency gains. Indeed, as Cassiman et al. (2005) shows in their literature review; 
neither purely substitutive- nor complementary technologies are good. There is a 
nonlinearity in which an adequate (Swedish: lagom) amount of technological 
complementarity is the best. 
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5.2 Synergies and economies of scale and scope 
Economies of scale in its classic form, i.e. that cost per unit can be decreased because of a 
larger output, was experienced in case 2. By using the same platform on a larger amount of 
car models, the very large cost of platform R&D could be distributed on more cars and thus 
reducing unit costs. Such economies in scale were not experienced by the other cases, and 
were also rejected in the study by Cassiman et al. (2005). However, the increased size 
following the M&A led to increased funding possibilities due to a larger budget, mentioned 
by case 3. Reaching a critical size and thus enabling R&D projects that were not feasible 
before the M&A was mentioned in case 1. Therefore, the synergy effect gained from 
increased company size, as mentioned by for example Pike and Neale (2009) seems to be 
present for R&D.  
Synergies and economies of scope were experienced or expected in all cases. Case 1 
described how existing knowledge in mechatronics and automation could be combined with 
the acquired knowledge in lubrication to build state of the art automatic lubrication systems. 
Case 2 explained how different areas of expertise from the different subsidiaries, for 
example safety in the case of VCC, could be used to develop well performing products. Thus, 
these M&As increased development capability, which is one of the implications of successful 
R&D (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2011). 
5.3 Geographically dispersed R&D 
Since all case studies were cross-border M&As and in none of those cases were large existing 
R&D centers moved following the M&A, geographically dispersed R&D, i.e. R&D centers 
located in many places, in the new entity was the result in all cases. Case 1 considered it 
important to have a geographical spread of the R&D centers in order to capture local tastes 
and requirements as well as using local knowledge clusters. Case 2 used geographically 
dispersed centers of excellence to use local knowledge clusters and to attract the best 
engineers. There are both pros and cons with such spread of the R&D centers. By being 
present in different regions, local tastes can be understood and access to knowledge clusters 
is enabled (Eppinger and Chitkara, 2006). However, both case 2 and 3 described the 
importance of personal contacts for the R&D work and how geographical distances 
restrained such personal contacts. To enable personal contacts across large distances, some 
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kind of Global Product Development might be used. Case 2 described frequent telephone 
and video meetings between engineers and also cooperation between different R&D centers 
by the use of IT tools, as was also mentioned by Case 1. Case 2 further emphasized the need 
for clear interfaces between different sub-systems, which is also described by Eppinger and 
Chitkara (2006) as the need for product modularity. Even though such tools for 
geographically dispersed R&D cooperation are useful, case 2 stressed the importance of 
face-to-face meetings of the involved engineers at least once during the development phase. 
Case 3 also mentioned the importance of face-to-face contacts, and even Eppinger and 
Chitkara (2006) mention that bi-directional travel is an important tool to build necessary 
trust between R&D employees. 
5.4 Where in the PD process can synergies be achieved? 
Case 1 experienced a widened scope of knowledge in the new entity compared to the old 
ones, which lead to an increased creativity that was most useful in the idea generation 
phase of the PD process. Case 3 mentioned monthly meetings with the R&D managers of all 
subsidies that could transfer ideas and knowledge, which in turn could lead to an increased 
creativity in the entity as a whole. Case 2 saw synergies for a larger part of the PD process, 
from idea generation to detailed product design. Are these differences based on technologic 
relatedness? It can be theorized that M&As of technologically complementary firms mostly 
generate efficiencies in the first part of the PD process because of the divesting into new 
technological fields that has been enabled by reaching critical mass. When new R&D projects 
have been launched, the two merged entities specialize in their own particular knowledge 
fields and then develop these precisely as they used to do before the merger, thus seeing 
most benefits in the initial phase of the PD process. For M&As of substitutive technology 
firms it has been shown that different parts of a product can be better developed by 
different subsidiaries of the new firm. By allocating the development of different parts 
where they can be most efficiently developed, such “complementary expert knowledge” 
gives the entity as a whole synergies throughout the PD process. 
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5.5 Harmonizing different working processes 
Case 3 described pretty substantial problems with adapting to the acquiring company’s 
processes for tracking R&D projects. The extra workload of changing the working procedure 
as well as a larger focus on positive results to the acquiring firm put pressure on the R&D 
personnel. It was perceived by case 3 that the new processes were in fact inferior to the 
ones previously used which further decreased motivation to adapt. Case 2 described similar 
problems although in that case the systems were more alike. However, it still took between 
2-3 years of process integration until the project management procedures had converged. 
Case 3 also described initial problems due to different technical and regulatory standards. 
Case 2 described how different software systems were used which required some years to 
change. Thus, the PMI problems discussed by for example Kummer (2009) and Hill (2010) 
consists, among other factors, of problems with aligning both technical- and managerial 
processes. Since these problems existed several years in both case 2 and 3 it seems hard and 
expensive to make them converge. It should therefore be considered how much the working 
procedures differ between the firms prior to an M&A. This finding corresponds to Hitt et al. 
(2001) where they explain that for an M&A to give synergies for R&D; organizational- and 
strategic fit are both necessary. 
5.6 Employee retention 
All cases stressed the importance of retaining key employees and none had suffered any 
major problems with employee turnover. Case 1 described how they used a soft approach 
when merging the two entities and that they decided not to relocate the large R&D centers 
due to the fear of losing engineers. Case 2 saw no significant increase in employee turnover 
purely due to the M&A, a sensitive approach to the integration by FMC could be the reason 
for that. Case 3 mentioned that some R&D projects had been scrapped by the new owner 
which had an emotional effect on the R&D employees, although no cases were identified 
where persons had left as a result of the M&A. It is notable that although for example Walsh 
and Ellwood (1991) and Ranft and Lord (2000) show a significantly higher employee turnover 
following M&As, no such effects were noticed by the participating interviewees. All case 
studies showed that the acquiring company used a soft and careful approach to integration, 
probably with the purpose of retaining employees. Case 1 had experienced previous 
problems with employees that voluntary left the company following M&As. The problem 
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was perceived more common for acquisitions of small and entrepreneurial companies, 
which might be explained by that such small companies could not adapt to the bureaucratic 
processes in the larger new entity. 
5.7 Unused synergies 
Case 3 described that possible synergies from a widened scope of knowledge was prohibited 
by the fact that the new owner did not clearly communicate where in the new entity such 
knowledge existed. It was also suggested that too much focus of the integration was put on 
the higher hierarchical levels and that a stronger emphasis of the integration of middle 
management and R&D employees could be useful. From the findings in case 3, another PMI 
problem could be identified as a failure to show existing sources of knowledge in the new 
entity, which prohibited the use of possible synergies. Case 1 stressed the importance of 
having an integration plan in order to avoid such problems.   
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6 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the research questions based on the 
empirical findings and the analysis in the previous chapter. Lastly, theoretical contributions, 
managerial implications and suggestions for future research are presented. 
6.1 How can positive synergies for R&D be utilized following an M&A? 
This report has shown that economies of scale, economies of scope, benefits of increased 
size and synergies from a combination of different knowledge inputs all could be a result of 
an M&A. Synergies from different knowledge inputs has been most prominent, and was 
discussed in all case studies. It can be assumed that such synergies are mostly found in 
M&As of technologically complementary firms since they should broaden the knowledge 
more than M&As of technologically substitutive firms. However, it was found that M&As of 
technologically substitutive firms also could achieve such synergies due to different levels of 
expertise in different areas of R&D. By combining the best parts from each subsidiary the 
entity as a whole could achieve R&D efficiencies throughout the PD process. Following cross-
border M&As the new entities will have R&D centers in different countries. Such 
geographically dispersed R&D has the benefits of capturing local tastes and getting access to 
local knowledge clusters. Thus, although coordination of the R&D in the new entity might be 
harder due to large distances, it seems unadvisable to move R&D centers following M&As. 
Also, if the R&D centers are to be moved following the M&A, the risk for losing key R&D 
employees is higher and therefore many of the possible synergies of the M&A are lost. 
6.2 What are the main problems for R&D post M&A? 
Harmonization of technical systems and R&D management procedures were the most 
prominent PMI problems elicited in this study. Solving such problems is time consuming and 
a source of frustration for R&D employees. The problem appears larger for M&As of 
technologically complementary firms than for technologically substitutive ones. Another 
problem is that it can be unclear where to find different sources of knowledge in the new 
entity. Such confusion effectively prevents the synergies from combining different 
knowledge. Another problem following an M&A is that to allow efficient R&D cooperation 
between the different parts of the new entity, new personal relations need to be formed. 
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Such personal relations are best developed face to face which is problematic if the 
geographical distance between the merging firms is large. Lastly, since most synergies for 
R&D originate from combinations of different knowledge, it is of vital importance to retain 
key R&D employees in order not to lose such knowledge. 
6.3 Theoretical contribution 
 The research in this study is in its nature not able to create a new theoretical model by 
itself. It has however shown both contradictions and resemblances to current theories. The 
empirical data adds on the current research that an adequate mix of both technological 
complementarity and substitutivity between the merging parts is best for utilizing R&D 
synergies post M&A. Current theories on why M&As fail often blame PMI problems. This 
research has deepened those theories by finding what the PMI problems are in the case for 
R&D. The empirical data has shown that managerial strategies and different working 
procedures are the main causes of such PMI problems for R&D. Thus, these findings 
correspond to current theories that advocate an organizational- and strategic fit as 
important requirements for successful M&As by showing that they are also relevant in the 
case of R&D. The study has also shown reluctance to move R&D centers following M&As, 
which in the case of cross-border M&As result in a geographically dispersed R&D 
organization. Therefore, the theories of co-located and cross-functional teams cannot easily 
be applied, which increases the necessity of new theories of organizing R&D such as GPD. 
6.4 Implications for managers 
In order to improve the chances of a successful M&A two managerial implications prior to 
the M&A has been identified in this study. In order to ensure a fit between the merging 
entities the degree of technological complementarity and substitutivity should be assessed. 
Both should be present, if either is too dominant, the synergies from the M&A might be 
limited. The fit between the companies’ technological systems and R&D management 
procedures should also be analyzed since a lack of such fit can lead to integration problems. 
Following the M&A, a distinctive and clearly communicated integration plan should be 
presented to all employees. The plan should not only focus on the higher hierarchies of the 
firms but also facilitate cooperation between R&D employees by clearly showing where 
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different sources of knowledge exist in the new entity. Furthermore, the integration process 
should allow personal relations between R&D employees in the different parts of the new 
entity to be established by face-to-face meetings. 
6.5 Suggestions for future research 
In the analysis we speculated on whether different technological relatedness between the 
merging parts could result in different synergies for R&D. Our assumption was that for 
complementary technology M&As, the synergies were mostly focused on the initial part of 
the R&D process, whereas for substitutive firms synergies were found throughout a larger 
part of it. By the small sample in this study, this phenomenon could not be confirmed. 
However, if it can be confirmed as correct, it would be of importance to consider prior to 
doing M&As and it is therefore an interesting subject to study further. Another suggestion 
for further research is related to GPD and cross-border M&As. This study showed that cross-
border M&As result in geographically dispersed R&D, which makes it hard for the new entity 
to use co-located and cross-functional teams in the R&D organization. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to study if GPD is actually a product of an increasing amount of cross-border 
M&As, and also if firms that prior to M&As already use GPD achieves more synergies than 
firms that do not use GPD. 
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